

5 November 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/AF
NIO/GPF
NIO/LA
NIO/NESA
NIO/USSR

SUBJECT : Updating and Possibly Changing the Scope of NIE 11-10

1. Some of us have been discussing the utility of redoing NIE 11-10, "Soviet Military Capabilities to Project Power and Influence in Distant Areas." The current estimate was published in February 1979 and a good deal has happened since then, including the Soviet move into Afghanistan, a further expansion of Soviet arms transfers, growth in Soviet airlift capabilities, etc.

2. Separately, some of us have also been discussing the various ways the Soviets support clients abroad: training, arms transfers, provision of experts, combat support, use of and support for Cuban and other helpful forces, etc. A case in point is, of course, Central America but Libya and other cases are also highly important. This subject was treated in the last NIE 11-10, as the attached Table of Contents shows.

3. One question is whether we should redo 11-10 with more or less the same scope or whether we should change it to include relatively more on the Soviet instruments for influence short of the capacity to apply force directly or, alternatively, more on its capacity to intervene directly?

4. A related question is how to deal with the support activities of governments which parallel those of the Soviets (e.g., Libyan financial support to the Sandinistas) but which may not be directed by Moscow. A similar case is presented by Cuba (and was discussed in the last 11-10). There is in fact a network of relationships similar to and overlapping with that we treated in the SNIE on terrorism.

5. I suggest that the addressees meet with me to discuss how to proceed. I will schedule the meeting.

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